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ABSTRACT. A stepping-stone connection has always been assumed as an 
intrusion since the first research on stepping-stone connections twenty years 
ago. However, not all stepping-stone connections are malicious. This paper 
proposes an enhanced stepping-stone detection (SSD) technique which is 
capable to identify legitimate connections from stepping-stone connections. 
Stepping-stone connections are identified from raw network traffics using 
timing-based SSD approach. Then, they go through an anomaly detection 
technique to differentiate between legitimate and attack connections. This 
technique has a promising solution to accurately detecting intrusions from 
stepping-stone connections. It will prevent incorrect responses that punish 
legitimate users. 
Keywords: stepping-stone connection, stepping-stone detection, intrusion, 
legitimate, anomaly detection 
INTRODUCTION 
A stepping stone is an intermediate host or node that is used as a hop point usually in tar-
geting a victim’s host in network. Stepping-stone detection (SSD) is a process of detecting the 
route of intermediate points to the origin of the starting attack point. This process will help to 
detect the starting point but not the adjacent host where the connection comes.  
Previous research in SSD mostly focused on detecting stepping-stone connections and 
stepping stones hosts. In SSD, every detected intrusion will be responded. However, not all 
connections which are characterized as stepping-stone connections are dangerous (Gilbert, 
Robinson, Butts, & Lacey, 2012; Gilbert, 2012). The main issue here is to correctly identify 
stepping-stone connections that are meant for intrusions. This has become vital because any 
false detection will affect the system because blocking the innocent channels may be consid-
ered as denial of service (DoS) attacks.  
A few researches focused on identifying intrusions in stepping-stone connections. Study 
by Ding and Huang (2011) generalized that legitimate users do not make long connections or 
stepping-stone connections to remote host. They assumed only connections that use four or 
more hosts were considered as intrusions. Research by Zhang and Paxson (2000) also as-
sumed only connection chains longer than three hosts are highly suspicious. However, this is 
contrary to the study conducted by Xinyuan Wang, Chen, and Jajodia in 2005 which indicated 
legitimate users also make long connections. Another research by Huang and Kuo (2011) 
believed that if stepping-stone connections are detected to have chaff, then those connections 
are considered as intrusions. However such explanation is doubtful because not all stepping 
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stone intrusions (connections) are being chaffed or the connections may have been perturbed 
by other pervasion techniques.  
This paper proposes a preliminary technique to identify legitimate and attack connections 
from stepping-stone connections. This paper is organized as follows. In the first section, SSD, 
terminologies and variant SSD approaches are explained. The next section discusses legiti-
mate stepping-stone connection and anomaly detection techniques. Different types of re-
sponses are also stated and enhanced SSD technique is presented at the end. 
STEPPING-STONE DETECTION (SSD) 
The stepping-stone connection is the chaining path from initiator to the victim through 
stepping stone machines. A stepping stone intrusion or attack occurs when attack commands 
or programs are transmitted through the connection chain from the attacker via intermediate 
hosts to the victim. When the victim performs an IP traceback, it will only recognize the adja-
cent host of the attacker but the initiator is undetected. This kind of attack will keep the at-
tacker anonymous because the attacker is not directly connected to the victim’s comput-
er/host.  
Terminologies 
Figure 1 shows a stepping-stone connection scenario of five hosts. Host A is the initial at-
tacker and Host E is the target. Host B, C and D are the intermediate hosts between Host A 
and Host E. 
 
Figure 1. Stepping-stone connection 
 
By referring to Host C; b is the incoming packet to Host C whereas c is the outgoing pack-
et. The connection occurs when a host logs from one host to another host. Connection a con-
nects Host A and B; b connects Host B and C; c connects Host C and D; and d connects Host 
D and E. So the sequence becomes a connection chain C = <a, b, c, d>. The downstream is 
the direction (arrows’ direction) of a host’s login and the upstream is the opposite direction.  
SSD Approaches 
Diversity of approaches or methods reflects the importance of conducting researches on SSD. 
Obviously most researchers agreed the first detection was content-based approach by 
Staniford-Chen and Heberlein (1995), unfortunately this approach seems inappropriate nowa-
days since most of today’s data are encrypted (Almulhem & Traore, 2007; Mohd Nizam 
Omar, 2011). Content-based approach only works on unencrypted or unmodified data. Fur-
thermore, it may compromise the confidentiality of data which are exposed in network traffics 
(Crescenzo, Ghosh, Kampasi, Talpade, & Zhang, 2011).  
Similarly, deviation-based approach also cannot withstand modification at the stepping 
stone (Almulhem & Traore, 2007). Moreover, it is also costly because it has to measure all 
packets in the networks (Kuo, 2011). Watermark-based alike deviation-based is undeniably 
costly. The implementation of ‘watermark’ demands extra hardware such as watermarker and 
watermark detector  which are required in performing detection (Xiaogang Wang, Luo, & 
Yang, 2012).  
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Recently timing-based and RTT-based approaches are mostly used in SSD. However, 
RTT-based was criticized for its nature of not accurately compute the packet timing (Kuo, 
2011). Moreover, RTT-based consumes twice the time of timing-based approach (Shullich, 
Chu, Ji, & Chen, 2011) because it has to consider timing for ‘send’ and ‘echo’ packets. While 
the accuracy of time in RTT-based is questioned, the timing characteristics in timing-based 
approach is unique enough to be used in the detection of stepping stones. Timing-based ap-
proach was acknowledged as the current and future approach in SSD (Kuo, Huang, Ding, 
Kern, & Yang, 2010; Mohd Nizam Omar & Rahmat Budiarto, 2009).  
LEGITIMATE STEPPING STONES 
In the past years, SSD has attracted much interest and increased awareness from research-
ers. However, there was little attention has been paid to legitimate stepping stones. Most of 
the researchers concluded that the stepping-stone connection is considered as one of the ways 
to employ intrusion through network. However, some network traffic activities may seem as a 
stepping stones but are not harmful.  
Wang et al. (2005), demonstrated that Voice over IP (VoIP) can be trace as stepping-stone 
connections. VoIP enables users to make telephone call through Internet rather than tradition-
al Public Switch Telephone Network (PSTN). It becomes attractive to people because it offers 
more cost savings and more interesting features. The research proved that authorized traffic 
such as VoIP can be detected and interpreted as stepping stones.  
In paper by Gilbert et al. (2012), it showed that administrators sometimes permitted com-
munication access through certain gateways. In this case, the gateways that were connected to 
the computers were listed as stepping stones. Once again the connection was not meant for 
any malicious intention. So, it is very important to filter stepping-stone connections because 
legitimate traffic connections may look like malicious traffic.  
ANOMALY-BASED DETECTION 
Anomaly-based detection or behavior-based detection technique assumes normal behavior 
is different from unacceptable deviation of expected behavior. The model for the anomaly is 
pre-defined by rules or activities. Since its introduction (by Denning in 1987), many research 
has been done to enhance it. It considers anything that is not fit to the list of normal behaviour 
is considered as threat or attack. It is the best way to detect new attacks or also known as ze-
ro-day attacks (Mitchell & Chen, 2014). The major advantage of this technique is the ability 
to detect novel attacks which cannot be detected by existing signature (Casas, Mazel, & 
Owezarski, 2011). 
Anomaly Techniques in SSD 
Most studies that apply anomaly techniques in SSD have only been conducted in small 
number of areas. Research by Yung in 2002 had been recognized as the leading research in 
this area. It detected stepping stones based on the difference of ‘send’ packet and ‘echo’ 
packet. Yang et al. (2004, 2005) proposed analyzing connections using anomaly in real-time. 
They managed to reveal the step-function like results that indicated a stepping stone for each 
‘jump’. A work by Kampasi et al. (2007) and Giovanni et al. (2011) developed three anomaly 
algorithms to detect the presence of chaff and jitter in enhancing timing-based approach for 
better detection. Huang and Kuo in 2011 demonstrated when a stepping-stone connection is 
being chaffed, then the connection is considered as part of the intrusion.  
It is clear that anomaly technique is a powerful tool in SSD but so far it is not been applied 
for identifying legitimate connection. The anomaly technique is chosen for it capability in 
defining normal and abnormal (intrusion). Combining timing-based approach with anomaly 
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technique ascertain our intention in uncovering legitimate (normal) connection from stepping-
stone connections. 
RESPONSE TO DETECTION 
The system can respond either passively or actively. A passive system notifies the admin-
istrator if any abnormality happens. It can also attempt to terminate the connection before any 
intrusion started such as terminating active TCP session. Active responses include modifying 
the attacked entity state or even reconfigure them to block several types of actions or direct 
the connections to somewhere else.  
Inappropriate responses may arise if the detector gives a wrong indication of false positive, 
i.e. give a false attack alarm even though the attack never happen (Shameli-sendi, Ezzati-
jivan, Jabbarifar, & Dagenais, 2012). The consequences of producing wrongful judgment of 
responses will i) decrease the network performance because if the network is disconnected, it 
will consume more energy to get back to its healthy stage; ii) mistakenly disconnect innocent 
hosts/users from the network; iii) increase cost in bringing back the services to the users in the 
network; and iv) deny services to the users of the network or perform DoS attack to the net-
work.  
ACCURATE SSD TECHNIQUE 
 
Figure 2. New SSD Technique 
 
Figure 2 illustrates enhanced SSD is capable on identifying intrusion from stepping-stone 
connections. The key components of this technique are discussed below. 
1) Capture Traffic. The network traffic (packet) is captured for analyze using common tool 
such as Wireshark or packet sniffer. The data (i.e. time) is used as input to timing-based 
approach. 
2) Timing-based detection approach. Timing-based approach is used to classify raw data 
based on the necessary data from previous phase. This approach can recognize stepping-
stone connections from raw network traffic. 
3) Anomaly detection technique. An anomaly technique is responsible to determine which 
stepping stone-connection is legitimate or attack connection. Combining timing-based 
approach with anomaly technique ensures SSD is more accurate in identifying intrusion 
traffic. 
4) Reference data. It stores information of normal behavior profiles. It provides anomaly 
detection with information for matching of legitimate or attack connection. 
5) Response. Response acts based on the detection by SSD. An accurate detection ascertains 
responses are correctly executed. 
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At the end of the process, legitimate connections are identified from raw stepping-stone 
connections. Combination of timing-based approach with anomaly detection technique capa-
ble to identify between legitimate and attack connection. Prior SSD treats all stepping-stone 
connections as intrusions. It responses to such detection by actively disable or reduce the net-
work performance. This kind of act costs a lot of money and energy to the user to rebuild the 
network to its peak. Our new SSD technique ensures that only attack connections being penal-
ized. Legitimate connections remain operating as usual. 
As a performance indicator in evaluating SSD, we use percentage of True Positive Rate 
(TPR) as in Eq. (1) and False Positive Rate (FPR) as in Eq. (2). Most of the research in SSD 
applied TPR and FPR as their evaluation approaches. Basically TPR will determine how effi-
cient the process to detect normal and attack connections and FPR will calculate the misdetec-
tion of the process (García-Teodoro, Díaz-Verdejo, Maciá-Fernández, & Vázquez, 2009).  
TPR = 
𝑛𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑏𝑙𝑒 𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑒 𝑖𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑠
𝑛𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑒 𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒
 (6) 
FPR = 
𝑛𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑏𝑙𝑒 𝑛𝑒𝑔𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝑖𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑠
𝑛𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑓𝑎𝑙𝑠𝑒 𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒
 (2) 
True Positive Rate (TPR) refers to the fraction of true instances detected by the technique 
versus all possible true instances. In this case, the technique has correctly detected the normal 
attacks from the list of connection chains. FPR refers to the fraction of negative instances that 
are falsely reported by the technique as being positive. In this case, the technique has falsely 
detected the attack connections even though they are normal connections. Proof of concept 
for enhanced SSD (eSSD) is as in Eq. (3). 
p ⇔ 𝑞 (3) 
p: eSSD with anomaly technique; q: accuracy in defining legitimate user. The compound 
statement p if and only q, denoted as in Eq. (3) is equivalence or biconditional. The notation 
is true only when both p and q are true or both are false. The equivalence can also be stated as 
p is necessary and sufficient condition for q. 
CONCLUSION 
Previous research in SSD simply assumed all stepping-stone connections as intrusion con-
nections. In this paper, we propose to combine timing-based approach with anomaly detection 
to identify legitimate and attack connections. Identifying legitimate connections from step-
ping-stone connections is crucial to avoid wrong punishments to the users in the network. 
Furthermore re-establishing the network after a wrong judgment affects users in the network 
and requires high cost and timely recovery. By identifying attack connection from stepping-
stone connection, misjudgement in punishing legitimate users and negative actions on the 
network can be prevented.  
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